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Too many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure 
sectors, have a long history of poor performance.  African governments and donors labored 
through the 1970s and 1980s to improve SOE performance through “commercialization”—
—i.e., methods short of ownership change.  These generally failed, giving rise, in the 1990s, 
to much more heavy reliance on private sector participation and ownership.  This approach 
produced some successes, but Africa’s private participation in infrastructure (PPI) initiatives 
have been comparatively few and weak.  A number of those that have been launched have 
run into problems, to the point where both investor and African government interest in the 
approach has waned in the last few years.  The reform is not popular—surveys of public 
opinion in 15 African countries reveal that only a third of respondents prefer private to state-
owned firms.  Nonetheless, African states (and their supporters) should not jettison the PPI 
approach.  Rather, they should acknowledge its limitations, and recognize the large scope 
and moderate pace of the preparatory measures required both to improve their investment 
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 1. Introduction  &  Summary 
 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have featured prominently in the development strategies of 
most states in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Far too many of these SOEs, and particularly 
those in infrastructure—energy, water and sewerage, telecommunications, transport—have 
a long history of poor performance. This situation had its roots in circumstances prevailing 
at the time most African states gained their independence, which led to the widespread 
adoption of statist, interventionist economic policies in the 1960s and 1970s.  These origins 
are reviewed, together with the problems they caused, the corrective measures attempted 
back in the 1970s and 1980s, and the results of early reform efforts.  The conclusion is that 
in this period African governments, with and without donor involvement, failed to reform 
state firms using evolutionary methods (often termed “commercialization” or 
“corporatization”) short of ownership change.  This failure gave rise to much more heavy 
reliance on private sector participation and ownership.   
 
The altered approach is reviewed, focusing on its application in infrastructure from about 
1990 to the present.  The private-sector oriented reform strategy has produced some clear 
successes in Africa, as measured by increases in the quantity and quality of service offered, 
particularly in telecommunications.  Most studies of private involvement in infrastructure 
conclude that performance improved, compared to what one could reasonably expect to 
have happened under continued public ownership and operation.  Still, it cannot be denied 
that sub-Saharan Africa has comparatively weakly and somewhat reluctantly participated in 
private participation in infrastructure (PPI) initiatives.  A number of those that have been 
launched have run into problems, to the point where both investor and African government 
interest in the approach has waned in the last few years.
1  The reform is not popular—
surveys of public opinion in 15 African countries reveal that only a third of respondents 
prefer private to state-owned firms. 
 
So:  The PPI approach has not, at least not yet, produced in Africa the massive investments 
and dramatically improved technical performance hoped for and still needed in transport, 
energy and water and sewerage.  Is the solution to return to a strategy of improving state 
firms under public management?  Any effort to reapply that strategy would have to 
overcome the many and serious problems encountered the first time around, revealed in 
detail below.  The evidence suggests that this will be very hard to do. Moreover, African 
governments do not possess the massive financial resources required to renew and expand 
their infrastructure networks.  And even a very large increase of “official” sources of 
infrastructure investment capital from the international financial institutions (IFIs) would 
not and could not bridge the gap. Only private capital markets can produce the sums 
required. 
 
The conclusion is that African states (and their supporters) should not jettison the PPI 
approach—especially when, as is shown below, so few of them have really put it to the test.  
Rather, they should acknowledge its limitations, and recognize the large scope and 
                                                           
1 And particularly after September, 2001, when many large infrastructure investors shifted their views 
concerning the risks and rewards of transactions in emerging and developing markets in general.   4
moderate pace of the preparatory measures required both to improve their investment 
climates and to make PPI work effectively.  
 
2.  The Starting Point:  Africa Opts for Socialism
2…. 
 
The majority of Sub-Saharan African states came into existence in the 1960s, following 
struggles and negotiations with the colonial powers.  At independence, most African 
governments inherited the notion that extensive public sector involvement in the economy 
was the natural, proper order of affairs.  Colonial regimes, especially after 1945, had 
created and run economic planning agencies, agricultural marketing and stabilization 
boards, and industrial and infrastructure parastatal enterprises.  They had instituted wage 
and price controls, and generally intervened in a large number of economic activities.   
Thus, most of the African leaders that came to power in the 1960s were accustomed to a 
high level of economic intrusion on the part of government. 
 
Moreover, many if not most of the new African leaders were ideologically predisposed to 
government control of the economy’s “commanding heights.”  In large part, this was 
because they saw a close link between liberal capitalism and colonialism and imperialism.  
The prevailing intellectual climate in the schools they attended and the circles they mixed 
in, at home and abroad, was leftist and statist; social democratic at least, and often more 
overtly “scientific” socialist. Africans who spent time in Europe, following World War II,  
noted the strong association between membership in left parties and organizations and 
opposition to colonialism.   
 
Moreover, in the 1950s and 60s, academic circles within Africa, and on both sides of the 
Atlantic, espoused planning and a high degree of public intervention in markets to protect 
the public interest.  Finally, a number of African intellectuals, reflecting on the many 
collectivist and community-oriented elements in their cultural heritage, concluded that 
socialism was more appropriate to African social circumstances. These ideas influenced the 
thinking of a number of African intellectuals from Sekou Toure and Leopold Senghor in 
the west of the continent, to Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere in the east.  They, and 
many other African leaders, became convinced that planning and socialism were superior 
to unfettered markets, which they blamed for Africa’s widespread poverty, ignorance and 
disease. 
 
In addition, the examples of Russia and China influenced African leaders.  These  countries 
had achieved political unity—a preoccupation in African multiethnic states—and 
apparently were emerging rapidly from underdevelopment due to the power of the socialist 
approach.  Their experiences fostered the belief that the solution to acute social and 
economic ills lay in managed, not free markets  Nor did the outspoken anti-colonialism of 
the Communist bloc in international forums hurt the socialist cause; the stance was 
especially welcomed by Africans.  In sum,  government intervention in the economy was 
seen as the natural order of affairs by new African regimes.  
 
                                                           
2 This section draws on Nellis (1986).   5
As a result, from 1960 through the early 1980s, at least 16 Sub-Saharan African countries 
designated their approaches as socialist, or on the path towards socialism.  A non-
exhaustive list includes Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso (at the time, Upper Volta), Congo-
Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  A number of other African states 
expressed general approval of a socialist approach without formally adopting one; and a 
few, such as Kenya, attempted to cloak what were obviously market-oriented policies in the 
garb of socialist principles.
3  Socialism became the prevailing African ideology.  Public 
ownership and management of productive entities, especially infrastructure, was its first 
operational principle.  
 
Even where ideology was not a factor, or where the depth of the dedication to socialist 
principles was questionable, there were two compelling practical concerns that appeared to 
justify public intervention: The very small size and limited capital, and the generally non-
African nature, of local private sectors.  
 
In most new African states the private sector was small, and more involved in commerce 
than production. Domestic business-people were mainly traders, brokers and merchants 
rather than large investors or industrial entrepreneurs. State intervention seemed justified 
by the embryonic or small-scale nature of the indigenous private sector.  Regarding 
ethnicity, in many African countries immigrant communities—Asians in East and parts of 
Central Africa, Lebanese in a number of West African states—held the leading positions in 
the retail commercial sector in cities and towns and even in the rural areas.  Regrettably, as 
elsewhere in the world, the presence of a non-native commercial minority spurred envy and 
resentment. A few leaders succumbed to the temptation to use this resentment for political 
ends; even the many that did not still felt obliged to take proactive steps to advance the 
economic interests of the black African majority.  Planning and state-owned enterprises 
seemed to be the logical policy responses.    
 
Leaders of developing countries, not only in Africa, were convinced that large-scale 
industrialization was, as the Algerians put it as late as 1975, the “remède unique aux 
problèmes de sous- développement,” (Algérie Presse Service, 1975).  They concluded that 
public enterprises were the solution to the questions of both scale and nationality.  It was 
believed that state-owned and operated firms would  aid technology transfer in fields that 
were supposedly strategic, in industry and infrastructure.  A number of development 
economists suggested at the time that publicly owned firms would be better—i.e., more 
rational and socially beneficial—investors, that they would fill “entrepreneurial gaps,” gain 
access to international concessionary and commercial credit denied to small local business-
people, provide services the private sector either would not or could not (or even, to some, 
should not), and generally serve as training centers where Africans would acquire the 
technical and administrative skills required in a modern economy (see, for example, 
Killick, 1981: chapter 11).  The point is that in the 1960s and 70s a number of plausible 
theoretical justifications for public enterprises were in the air, lending respectable economic 
support to what governments in Asia, Latin America and Africa were strongly predisposed 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Government of Kenya,  African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965).   6
to do for social and political reasons.  Nor can one discount the fact that state intervention 
in productive entities provided a number of  highly lucrative perks and rents to the 
inheriting elites, almost none of whom had extensive private sector backgrounds, ties or 
personal wealth. 
 
3….and this results in a comparatively large public enterprise sector 
 
With these motivations and rationales, after independence many African states embarked 
on the creation of state-owned and operated firms. In the more ideologically committed 
states—Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia—expropriation was applied in key sectors.  
Tanzania, for example, nationalized a number of industries and agro-industrial estates in 
1967 “to ensure the proper management of the commanding heights” of the economy; “to 
transform the economy by articulating the principles of socialism and self-reliance;” and to 
promote income and regional equity. (Msambichaka and Bagachwa, 1984: 384)  Since 
most African states started with state-owned infrastructure sectors, nationalization of such 
firms was usually unnecessary.  It did happen:  Senegal, for example, in 1971 nationalized 
the privately leased and managed urban water system it had inherited at independence.  
 
There are great gaps in the data, but it is estimated that by the end of the 1970s the average 
African country’s public enterprise sector accounted for over 17 percent of GDP, compared 
to a worldwide average of about 10 percent (falling to 5 percent in OECD countries).  Of 
course, there was great variation among African countries, with the more dedicated or overt 
socialists and nationalizers having the largest state sectors, with others—Botswana, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, for example—well below the average.  However, in line with close to 
universal practice at the time, all African countries, socialist or not, held most or all of their 
infrastructure services in public ownership and operation. 
 
Other measures  from a number of African studies and surveys in the 1970s and 80s show 
the economic importance of state-owned enterprises (henceforth SOEs): 
•  SOEs accounted for about one-quarter of total formal sector employment in all 
reporting African countries, and more than 18 percent of all non-agricultural 
employment;
4  
•  SOEs accounted for more than 20 percent of gross domestic investment;  
•  more than 14 percent of total external debt, and 
•  more than one-third of domestic credit. 
•  In  15 of 22 francophone African countries surveyed, SOEs ranked first in sales. 
Clearly, Sub-Saharan African states relied heavily on SOEs to achieve their economic 
objectives. 
 
                                                           
4 Compared to, at the time, 4 percent in OECD countries,  15 percent in Asia, 5.5 percent in Latin America 
and 10 percent in reporting North African countries (source:  Nellis, 1986, 10).   7
4. Poor  performance 
 
From the outset SOE financial and economic performance generally failed to meet the 
expectations of their creators and funders.  This was not universally the case; in most 
African countries in the period 1965-80 (and beyond) there were SOEs that performed, at 
least for a time, adequately and sometimes very well, by the most stringent of standards 
(e.g., Ethiopian Airlines, the Kenya Tea Development Authority, Sierra Leone’s Guma 
Valley Water Company). But the good performers were heavily outnumbered  by the bad.   
 
Consider the case of  Kenya,
5 where in 1982 the Government estimated the annual average 
rate of return on the $1.4 billion (1981 dollars) invested in SOEs since independence, in 
1963, to be 0.2 percent——a barely positive return greatly less than what could have been 
obtained by depositing the sum in an interest-bearing account.  Moreover, the slightly 
positive overall rate of return was due to the good performance of a few profitable firms.  
Most SOEs, especially crop marketing boards in the agricultural areas on which the bulk of 
the population depended for their livelihood, persistently ran large losses (and provided a 
poor quality of service).  In addition, Kenyan investigators found little evidence that the 
SOEs were producing a level of social benefits—increased employment, improved income 
distribution, contributions to regional equality, technology transfer and management 
training—that might have offset or justified the investment, and that a number of apologists 
cited as reasons to overlook the poor financial performance.  In several cases where it was 
claimed that such benefits were being produced, the point was asserted rather than 
demonstrated.  
 
Aggregate data were not produced in this period, but bits and pieces of information 
cumulatively mounted to a damning indictment of SOE performance continent-wide.  For 
example, in twelve West African countries, 62 percent of surveyed SOEs showed net 
losses, and 36 percent were in a state of negative net worth. (Bovet, 1985)   By the end of 
the 1970s, cumulative SOE losses in Mali amounted to 6 percent of GDP.  A 1980 study of 
eight Togolese SOEs revealed that  losses in this group alone equaled 4 percent of GDP.  In 
Benin, more than 60 percent of SOEs had net losses; more than three-fourths had 
debt/equity ratios greater than 5 to 1; close to half had negative net worth, and more than 
half had negative net working capital.  (Grosh and Mukandala: 1994, 17)  A 1985 survey of  
transport sector SOE performance in 18 francophone African countries found that only 
one-fifth generated revenue sufficient to cover operating costs, depreciation and financial 
charges.  Another fifth covered variable costs plus depreciation but not finance charges; a  
further 40 percent covered only operating costs, while the final fifth were not even covering 
these.  (World Bank, 1985: 36,7)  While few other economic studies undertaken in this 
period singled out infrastructure SOEs, their relatively large economic and financial size, 
and additional anecdotal evidence, suggest that they were major contributors to the low 
level of general performance.   
 
                                                           
5 Though Kenya was far from socialist it still amassed a large and important SOE sector, comprised, by 1984, 
of 176 commercial or semi-commercial enterprises and a further 147 statutory boards.  These SOEs accounted 
for 8 percent of GDP, 55 percent of public sector capital formation, 31 percent of public and 15 percent of 
total formal employment.   8
In a great number of African countries the financial burden posed by poorly performing 
SOEs, particularly those in infrastructure, caused macro-fiscal problems.  In addition, the 
often inadequate quantity and poor quality of infrastructure services was annoying (and in 
the case of poor quality water, dangerous)  to regular customers, and raised costs and 
discouraged investment in the private sector.  Consumers across the continent had to wait 
years for phones or to obtain connection to the electricity grid; outages were frequent and 
prolonged; the wait for repairs was lengthy; bribes—that could be very large—were usually 
required to obtain a connection or a repair; public transport was often expensive, always 
overcrowded and unreliable, and sometimes unsafe.  A large percentage of private African 
firms could not (and still cannot)
6 depend on publicly provided infrastructure services and 
were forced to invest in high-cost alternatives; i.e., electric generators, wells, road-building 
and maintenance, the stringing of their own telephone lines, etc.   
 
5.  Causes of poor performance 
 
Many studies of this period looked into the causes of poor SOE performance.  The 
diagnosis was that the fundamental problem of SOEs, in infrastructure as well as 
manufacturing, was multiple and conflicting objectives.  Government owners decreed that 
their SOEs operate in a commercial, efficient and profitable manner, and at the same time 
insisted that they provide goods and services at prices less than cost-covering levels, serve 
as generators of employment, receive their inputs from state-sanctioned suppliers, choose 
plant location on political rather than commercial criteria, etc., etc. The mixing of social 
with commercial objectives inevitably led to political interference in operational decisions 
to the detriment of managerial autonomy, commercial performance, and economic 
efficiency.  The syndrome manifested itself in: 
 
•  Poor initial investment decisions:  This factor applies more to industrial and 
commercial than to infrastructure SOEs.  Examples include Niger’s uranium 
producing SOE, where planners assumed that the historically high mid-1970s 
market price for uranium would persist indefinitely (it did not); a textile SOE in 
Benin relying heavily on unfettered exports to Nigeria (the Nigerians closed the 
border to textile imports); a banana-boxing, for export, SOE in Somalia which 
had a breakeven production level higher than national banana production (the 
anticipated increase in production never occurred); a SOE shoe factory in 
Tanzania (supported by the World Bank) that never exceeded 4 percent of rated 
production; etc. The African landscape became littered with SOEs producing at 
a fraction of rated capacity, generally incurring large losses, and failing to 
service the debts incurred in their creation.  Risky investment decisions are, of 
course, an inescapable part of doing business.  A critical problem with SOEs in 
Africa (and elsewhere) is that SOE managers lacked the flexibility and 
autonomy to respond to shifting market conditions.  Their government owners 
would not allow them to cut costs by shedding labor, closing plants, dropping or 
adding production lines, changing suppliers, etc.  The problems of poor initial 
                                                           
6 World Bank “investment climate” surveys in 8 SSA countries, dating from 2003-4, indicate that almost half 
of private firms surveyed had installed generators to provide power during outages.    9
investments were greatly compounded by a pronounced lack of managerial 
agility. 
•  Inadequate capitalization:   Few African governments were able to endow their 
SOEs with proper levels of initial and working capital, forcing them to rely 
heavily on debt to finance basic operations.  This was imprudent, expensive, 
and, in infrastructure, harmful to network expansion to serve unmet demand.  
As direct government transfers to SOEs of all sorts declined greatly in the 
1980s (due to internal financial problems and external pressure from the IFIs, 
discussed below), SOEs turned to borrowing from the banking sector, itself 
largely state-owned at the time.  Costs mounted, non-payment of debts 
multiplied, and SOEs sunk deeper and deeper into financial problems.  In 
addition, the channeling of most commercial bank credit to SOEs (e.g., 80 
percent in Senegal in the 1980s) “crowded out” loans to private firms.  
 
•  Below-cost pricing:   This was a critical shortcoming in infrastructure SOEs.  
For social reasons, most African governments either set initial infrastructure 
tariffs at less than cost-covering levels, or failed to raise the tariffs as costs 
increased over time, or both.  Low prices were justified on the grounds they 
helped poorer consumers afford essential services such as water and electricity.  
In reality, only a tiny fraction of African populations were linked to 
infrastructure formal distribution systems; these served only the urban areas, 
and mainly the commercial, official and elite residential sections of these urban 
areas.  The principal beneficiaries of below-cost pricing were, and are, the 
comparatively well-off.  Moreover, as noted, low revenues starved the 
infrastructure firms of the capital needed to expand into unserved areas. 
 
•  Collection deficiencies:   Collection failures have plagued African infrastructure 
SOEs. The major delinquents have been government ministries and agencies, 
including other SOEs.  Few SOEs have been able to cut service to non-paying 
clients, particularly government agencies.  Infrastructure SOEs (and industrial 
ones as well) often reacted to the financial strain by failing to pay due taxes, 
customs duties, debts to state-owned banks and suppliers, contributions to social 
security systems, etc.  This resulted in a cascading series of unpaid cross-debts, 
eroding discipline throughout the financial system.  
 
•  Poor reporting systems:  A critical deficiency was inadequate financial 
reporting and monitoring systems:  that is, weak or non-existent accounting at 
the level of the firm, and insufficient monitoring and follow up of firm and 
sector results by government reviewers and auditors.  In Tanzania, for example, 
a 1988 study noted that, over time, about 1/3 of  the country’s 425 SOEs failed 
to produce basic accounts.  Of accounts actually produced, 3/5 were normally 
judged as “deficient” by the national auditor.   Of the minority of 112 SOEs that 
generally submitted non-deficient accounts, ¼ ran losses.  The upshot was that 
only 84 SOEs—18 percent of the sector—could be judged as generally 
profitable. (Nellis, 1988, 17)  The same report noted that only a handful of 
Tanzanian SOEs carried out regular inventories of assets, and there  were few   10
signs of control of cash, credit, procurement, or financial relations with 
subsidiaries.  All this despite (perhaps because of) the existence of an 
astonishing 19 separate levels of supervision and control of SOEs, from 
workers councils, management committees, general managers and boards of 
directors within firms, through reviewing holding companies, parent, and 
several other technical ministries, beyond to the Commission of Public 
Investments in the Treasury (Ministry of Finance), to a variety of  specialized 
bodies such as the Tanzania Audit Corporation, the Standing Committee on 
Parastatal Organisation (SCOPO), the single party’s Standing Committee on 
Parastatals, a Parastatals Organisation Committee in Parliament, and periodic 
interventions by the National Price Commission, the Registrar of Companies, 
the National Productivity Council, etc. etc.   
 
•  Deficient Boards of Directors:  In theory, Boards of Directors represent the 
interests of the shareholders of a firm; they are the first line of an owner’s 
defense.  Boards were constituted in a large percentage of African SOEs; but 
they generally failed to perform the functions of policy-makers, performance 
evaluators, supervisors of management and buffer between government and the 
S O E .   W h y ?   A t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  p r oblem lay the issue of misplaced and 
inadequate incentives for both the representatives of the principal and the 
agents.  Statutes often called for Ministers to hold seats on boards; in reality 
Ministers usually found more important things to do and SOE boards tended to 
be made up of middle-level civil servants, few with relevant technical or 
commercial experience. Typically, the same civil servants would sit on several 
or indeed many boards, diluting their already modest capacity to monitor 
corporate events. The implicit role of board members became to protect the 
interest of their  ministry, a task often at odds with advancing the welfare of the 
SOE.  Seldom, if ever, did African boards have any role in the selection of 
management.  “Boards do not ensure managements achieve set targets of 
performance.  Even where targets are set, weak boards often accept inadequate 
explanations from the managements for shortfalls in performance.” (Tanzania 
Audit Corporation, 1986, 15)  Board members often received fees and “sitting 
allowances” for attending meetings; board membership was used to reward 
political cronies, retiring generals, and MPs. 
 
•  Other shortcomings:  Many SOE managers were untrained and owed their posts 
to political connections rather than technical skills. A number of them, in the 
absence of close and effective monitoring, used the firm’s resources for 
personal or familial enrichment.   Many African (and European, Asian and 
Latin American) politicians and public officials have reaped material and 
prestige benefits from SOEs, in the form of loans, gifts, transport, housing, 
board memberships, future jobs for themselves, present jobs for friends, 
relatives and supporters, procurement kick-backs, and much else.  Domestic 
private sectors often have cozy supply relationships with SOEs that could be 
threatened by the arrival of more aggressive, quality-conscious, cost-cutting 
private owners.  Thus, weak management was as much caused by the   11
dysfunctional general system as it was a cause of it.  It required exceptional 
managerial competence and personal devotion to overcome the many and 
severe policy and political obstacles to good performance.  SOE managers were 
seldom given the resources and incentives and above all the autonomy to lead; 
they were rarely punished for poor practice and even less often rewarded for 
good; they spent endless hours in meetings in reviewing agencies and ministries 
in which discussion was interminable and decisions were rare.  In sum, SOE 
managers possessed autonomy in areas where they should have been closely 
monitored—on most matters of financial reporting—and they generally lacked 
decision-making power where it was needed—concerning day-to-day 
operational matters. 
  
In many African countries, a common scenario was as follows:  Government failed to 
monitor SOE performance, or failed to act on the information it received.  SOE losses 
mounted, and were covered through direct transfers from the budget and through indirect 
subsidies (e.g., as noted, the non-collection in SOEs of taxes, duties, social security 
payments, and later, bank loans; the tolerance of arrears to suppliers and utilities).  By the 
late 1970s the African SOE financial situation was alarming, and by the early 1980s, 
critical.  Almost everywhere in SSA the poor financial performance of SOEs became so 
burdensome to government budgets that it grew to be an obvious and major part of a 
“financing gap”——thus attracting the attention of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank (the IFIs).   
 
6.  Enter the IFIs 
 
Well prior to the recognition of SOEs as an aggregate problem area, the World Bank had 
been involved in lending to individual African utilities, in energy, transport and water and 
sewerage.  In consequence, some technical and managerial capacity had been installed, and 
some financial and operational improvement occurred.  Results however were piecemeal 
and modest; broader and more sustained attention was required. 
 
The IFI response was first, to analyze the problem in greater detail; second, to assist 
African governments in setting up monitoring methods and agencies to obtain and act on 
performance data (and tabulate and settle the cross-debts which were particularly 
troublesome for infrastructure SOEs, usually situated at the end of the payments chain); 
and third, to include conditions in loans requesting and requiring the borrowing 
government to take policy and institutional steps to correct the performance problems.   
 
The recognition of the magnitude and depth of African SOE problems coincided with the 
launching, in 1979, of the World Bank’s “structural adjustment” lending operations. These 
operations differed from the Bank’s traditional bricks and mortar projects that built dams, 
roads, schools or airports.  Adjustment loans provided large resource injections  in return 
for which the borrower committed to taking measures designed to correct unstable 
“imbalances” in the economy.
7 Invariably, the recommended measures involved 
                                                           
7 These imbalances could be brought about by unforeseen external “shocks;” e.g., rapid rises in energy prices, 
or by internal problems such as collapse of an export market.     12
“reductions in expenditures to bring about an orderly adjustment of domestic demand to the 
reduced level of external resources available to the country.” (World Bank, 1991, 11)   
Since financial losses in African SOEs, especially infrastructure SOEs, tended to be 
substantial, they became a natural focus of the adjustment process.
8  
 
Adjustment loans and credits disbursed very rapidly.  This gave participating governments 
quick access to badly needed foreign exchange, ostensibly to deal with balance of 
payments problems.  The policy changes agreed upon
9 could often be signed into existence 
just as quickly; but their implementation required institutional and behavioral change that 
was at least of a medium- and often of a long-term nature.  To deal with these structural or 
institutional needs, adjustment operations were frequently accompanied by longer-term 
technical assistance operations furnishing borrowers with the expertise and training 
required.  So, policy shifts were addressed in the “conditions” of the adjustment loans and 
credits, while the parallel technical assistance operations attempted to analyze and correct 
the informational and institutional deficiencies.  (Henceforth in this study, “adjustment” 
refers to the actions requested and required in both types of loan or credit.) 
 
From 1979 to 1989, the World Bank
10 approved 51 structural adjustment operations with 
SOE-related components.  SOE issues were also addressed in an additional 47 “sectoral 
adjustment operations,” that is, loans and credits focusing on a single area or a few key 
economic problems.  A few of these were specific to the SOE sector and were called 
PERLs; public enterprise reform loans.  (Nellis, 1989b, 3-4)   Many countries received 
more than one adjustment loan or credit in this period.  Turkey alone, for example, took on 
five full adjustment and two sectoral operations.  In total, the 51 structural adjustment 
operations through 1989 went to 34 different countries, and the 47 sectoral operations went 
to 31 different countries.   
 
Africa was heavily represented in these SOE-related adjustment operations: 18 different 
African countries received 27 of the 51 structural mechanisms, and 15 different African 
countries  received 24 of the 31 sector operations containing SOE components.  There was 
considerable overlap in the two groups, but six African states received only sectoral credits. 
This raised to 24 the number of African countries receiving adjustment loans or credits 
containing SOE components.  In sum, African cases accounted for 70 percent of the SOE-
related adjustment universe in the 1980s.  What was attempted, with what results?   
 
                                                           
8 The World Bank’s first explicit African SOE correction program began in Senegal, in 1976.  The mounting 
data on poor SOE performance, and the budgetary burdens posed by this performance,  contributed to the 
development of adjustment lending.   
9 All participating governments issued, at the beginning of each adjustment operation, a “letter of development 
policy,” specifying major problems and stating the corrective steps they would take in the course of the 
operation.  In many cases, particularly in low income countries,  these were almost entirely drafted by Bank 
staff.  True, the policies were always discussed with borrower government officials.  Still, in Africa, local  
“ownership” of the required policy shifts was usually limited to a few convinced officials in the borrowing 
country’s financial institutions; i.e., the central bank and the ministry of finance.   
10 Focus is on the World Bank because of (1) the availability of data and (2) the fact that at this point in time 
the IMF left structural changes to the World Bank.  The expansion of IMF conditionality into such details 
came later.   13
7.  SOE reforms attempted:  Commercialization 
 
African SOE adjustment components in the 1980s centered on: operational analysis and 
information production, financial measures in and outside the enterprise to stem the flow of 
SOE sector losses, a wide range of restructuring and performance improvement measures 
not involving ownership change, the closure and liquidation of some loss-making 
commercial (not infrastructure) firms, and the preparation for—and in some cases, the 
carrying out of—privatization.   
 
Requested
11 specific reforms  included: 
•  classification studies to examine the proper role of the state and categorize the 
country’s SOE portfolio into those to be retained, restructured, sold or closed 
(this led to considerable discussion and debate on the definition of a strategic 
SOE);  
•  the elimination of SOE  monopolies and monopsonies; 
•  legal and legislative reforms aimed at making SOEs more corporate in nature, 
rationalizing control procedures, increasing managerial autonomy, altering the 
form, duties and responsibilities of Boards of Directors, etc.   
•  shifts in pricing formulae; i.e., specification of the method of determining 
infrastructure service tariffs, including when and how prices should be reviewed 
and altered; 
•  studies and actions on labor policy;  through the support of studies determining 
the level of overstaffing, the creation and funding of severance pay 
mechanisms, training and redeployment schemes, and calls for retrenchment in 
specific firms or across the SOE sector; 
•  rationalizing SOE financial systems through arrears settlement efforts, reducing 
automatic or concessionary access to credit, strengthening the scrutiny of SOE 
expenditure and borrowing, strengthening internal accounting and external 
reviewing, and creating a level financial playing field between SOEs and 
private firms; 
•  creating or reinforcing SOE monitoring bodies; an activity heavily supported 
by technical assistance personnel; 
•  closing persistently loss-making commercial SOEs; 
12  
•   privatization, or the preparation for privatization, of a SOE or a set of SOEs, 
again, in this period, almost all commercial in nature, and none in infrastructure. 
 
Some examples:  In multiple adjustment operations in Ivory Coast the principal SOE 
conditions were to set up financial reporting systems and establish monitorable indicators 
of management efficiency and enterprise productivity. “Extended actions” in the parallel 
TA loans included “reductions in real transfers to public enterprises,” extension of a 
financial and performance reporting system to 31 major SOEs, the “rehabilitation of five 
                                                           
11 In all approved adjustment operations the conditions were agreed to by the borrowing government—but that 
does not mean they were actually adopted. 
12 Closure and liquidation of a non-profitable commercial SOE was a condition of adjustment in Benin, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Niger and Senegal.     14
enterprises, audits of three, improvements of supervisory procedures in four.” (World 
Bank:  1991, 291)  All the major infrastructure SOEs were in the list of 31.   
 
In Ghana, the focus was on cutting costs in the sector, mainly through payroll reductions.  
However, the bulk of this reduction was accomplished by removing 25,000 non-existent 
“ghost workers” from the payroll of the Cocoa Board, a promotion and marketing SOE for 
the country’s main cash crop and export. (World Bank:  1991, 317) Other measures aimed 
at reviewing the qualifications and competence of managers in infrastructure SOEs, and 
studying and improving management procedures.   
 
In Senegal the thrust of adjustment-supported reforms was improving SOE performance. 
From 1981 through 1988 a key feature of Senegalese SOE reform was the “contract-plan;” 
a theoretically binding, three to five year agreement setting out the mutual rights and 
responsibilities of the state—as owner and principal of the firm—and management, the 
agent.  Detailed contract-plans were signed in nine different Senegalese SOEs including the 
infrastructure firms in transport, electricity, water, telecommunications, post and ports.  In 
these contract-plans,  government committed to a tariff regime and specified the conditions 
under which tariffs could be changed, and by how much; promised to provide the firm with 
stipulated investment resources; engaged to pay off existing arrears and  to enforce policies 
preventing the re-emergence of arrears, and to limit government involvement in the firm to 
the specific areas and modes established in the document.  The idea was to increase the 
autonomy of management to correctly guide the firm, enhance efficiency in the use of 
resources, and minimize—or explicitly compensate the firm for—non-commercial 
objectives.  In return, SOE management committed to fulfilling a set of performance 
indicators leading to improved service quality and, often, expanded service quantity; meet 
investment timetables, and cut costs (most often by eliminating superfluous labor).     
Contract-plans of this type were installed in 11 SSA countries in addition to Senegal:   




Two summary points:  First, while even at this relatively early date there was a strong 
emphasis in adjustment conditionality on liquidation, lease or sale of seemingly hopeless 
SOEs,
14 four of every five SOE conditions aimed at performance improvement through 
various forms of commercialization, not sale.  Second, where closure or privatization was a 
condition of adjustment, it usually applied to commercial and manufacturing SOEs, not 
those in infrastructure.  Private sector management or financing in an infrastructure SOE 
was now and then requested, but in no case was outright divestiture or even the lease of an 
infrastructure firm a matter of conditionality. 
 
                                                           
13 In the countries italicized, contract-plans were installed as a result of World Bank adjustment operations. 
14 One attempt to quantify the strength of the preference looked into the details of SOE reform in the 1980s in 
9 adjusting countries, five of them in SSA.  Of the 143 individual SOE reforms reviewed, 21 dealt with the 
closure or lease or sale, full or partial, of a SOE.  An additional 8 conditions called for the preparation for 
privatization without demanding the actual sale.  Taken together, these measures made up 20 percent of all 
conditions, the single largest category.  (Other actions most often called for  dealt with pricing issues, reforms 
in the institutional framework, restructuring of a specific firm [usually an infrastructure firm], reductions in 
the workforce, and financial audits of troubled companies.  [Nellis:  1989b, 15])   15
8.   Results of the commercialization approach 
 
Price increases in SSA infrastructure SOEs proved relatively easy to implement.   
Monopoly providers were seldom averse to raising their revenues, so there was little or no 
opposition from firm managers.  Since many government agencies had seldom paid the old 
tariffs, and doubted that they would be forced to behave differently in the future, increases 
rarely raised intense opposition from within ministries.  Only those consumers who could 
not evade payment were discontent, since service quality did not often immediately rise in 
tandem with higher prices. The overall financial impact on the flow of funds was not as 
great as had been anticipated, due to the continuing non-payment of major clients, and the 
reluctance of many governments to do more than sanction a one-time price increase.  The 
letter of the conditionality was often met (sometimes not even that), but the spirit—
institutionalizing a tariff system based on marginal costs for infrastructure providers, that 
would react to systemic changes such as inflation—was rarely pursued. 
 
The easing of budgetary burdens was also accomplished quickly, at least on paper.  Edicts 
ending government subventions were enacted.  In many adjusting African countries, direct 
transfers from government budgets fell greatly and rapidly.  Yet again, there was a “but:”  
The ending of loss-covering direct transfers left many SOEs in dire need of working 
capital, which they obtained from the state-owned banking system—with the explicit or 
implicit approval of government.  In effect, the shutting off of a direct resource flow from 
one government-controlled tap was matched by the opening of a second, less direct, but 
still government-influenced faucet.  In many countries, therefore, the decline in the official 
government deficit was matched or even exceeded by increases  in indirect flows, and 
increases in the “quasi-fiscal deficit.”   
 
A fair amount of staff reduction took place in African SOEs, but the pace was slower  and 
the financial impact less than anticipated.  Few could complain about the elimination of 
“ghost” workers, and tighter reporting and monitoring systems led to some substantial 
reductions in these.  However, opposition to the retrenchment of existing workers was 
substantial.  The affected workers were visible, organized and vocal; their plight and 
protests raised the sympathies of many in Africa beyond workers and unions, from 
journalists and academics to civil servants and politicians of all sorts—usually including 
many in the enacting government. Lay-offs were deeply unpopular.  They raised the 
political temperature and contributed  to the rising public antipathy in Africa towards 
adjustment and the World Bank. Even when outright opposition was muted, retrenchment 
could and did encounter problems:  Ghana’s program of SOE workforce reduction, for 
example, was stopped as government realized it could not afford, even with World Bank 
loans, the extremely generous severance packages previously negotiated with public sector 
unions.  In Niger, Zambia and elsewhere a number of workers were dismissed from SOEs, 
but many of those laid off found their way back into public employment in other SOEs, 
ministries or government agencies.  Overall savings in the public sector wage bill tended to 
be modest. 
 
Most disappointing were rehabilitation and restructuring efforts in SOEs.   Under pressure 
from donors, government could and did commit to drastic and sometimes socially painful   16
restructuring, including price hikes and layoffs.  But the reforms often were not sustained; 
back-sliding was common.  Governments would commit in principle to behavior change on 
which they could not or would not follow through.  
 
The experience of Senegal illustrates the issue:  By the end of the 1980s its SOE reform 
program had been underway for over a decade; it had been heavily supported by donor 
programs; and it had attempted comprehensive performance improvement measures   
through the contract-plan approach.  Despite all this, the financial performance of the sector 
continuously declined in this period, with aggregate losses in SOEs almost doubling 
between 1982 and 1986, the peak years of the reform effort.  
 
Hopes had been high for the contract-plans since they addressed the issues analysts had 
most often cited as problematic:  In them, the commercial aims of SOEs were given 
priority, the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the two contracting parties were 
clearly specified, and precise performance measures, and the means by which they would 
be evaluated, were established.  Tariff regimes were specified, investment programs 
determined, operations costed out and subsidies and compensation for non-commercial 
objectives imposed by government established.   
 
But in many cases, the Government of Senegal proved unable or unwilling to honor the  
obligations it had made in the contract-plans, particularly the financial commitments.   
Tariff hikes called for in a contract-plan were later rejected by government.  Commitments 
for government agencies to pay utility bills were not honored.  Promises to make 
investment capital available to infrastructure SOEs were not kept.  Managers attempting to 
cut costs, in line with the terms of the contract-plans, were forbidden by government 
superiors to fire workers, cut off service to delinquent customers, change suppliers, etc.  
Almost all the contract-plans had to be extensively and repeatedly revised, and many fell 
into abeyance.  (Nellis:  1989b, 23-4)   
 
The problem was that, despite the name, the agreements were not contracts in any binding 
sense.  Government  could, and did, ignore with impunity the terms of the agreement; 
managers had no legal recourse to force government to honor its obligations. (Nellis: 
1989a, 77-8)  As this became clear, the impact of the approach diminished.  For example, 
in Congo (Brazzaville), 10 of the 18 contract-plans devised were abandoned in process. In 
Senegal, second-phase contract-plans tried to correct the problems by linking the plan 
period to the budget cycle, setting up high-level implementation committees to pressure 
and cajole government to meet its obligations, presenting alternative scenarios of 
performance, financing and pricing rather than stipulating one path only—but none of it 
worked; the revised contract-plans too failed to resolve the key issue of non-payment of 
utility bills by government departments.  (Nellis: 1989a, 44)  The mechanism continued to 
be applied, particularly in francophone Africa, up until the mid-1990s.  But overall, this 
seemingly promising device, on which so much African government and donor resources 
were expended, produced few lasting results.   
   17
9.  First Steps in Privatization
15  
 
As disappointment mounted with SOE reform and rehabilitation measures, donor 
enthusiasm grew concerning privatization.  In retrospect, this enthusiasm appears to have 
been generated as much or more by deep frustration with performance improvement 
approaches other than divestiture, and by expectations based on theory, rather than on hard 
empirical evidence of the superiority of private participation and ownership in the African 
setting.  True, past SOE reforms not involving the private sector were deeply dissatisfying, 
and often the explanation was the incapacity of government owners to do or to sustain what 
needed to be done.  Equally true, the theoretical advantages of private participation were 
considerable.  Still, the shift to privatization was something of a leap of faith.   
 
Nonetheless, in the 1980s, privatization of SOEs took place in a number of African states—
including Senegal, Niger, Kenya,  Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea—and was called for by 
the IFIs in a number of others.  In very few African cases was the decision to privatize 
totally home-grown or strongly endorsed or supported by domestic decision- and opinion-
makers. While African proponents of privatization could be found, the main impetus for 
divestiture came from the donor community in general, and the IFIs in particular.  To 
repeat, these early divestitures were relatively few in number, and concentrated in 
commercial-manufacturing, not infrastructure SOEs. 
 
One tabulation calculated that worldwide, in the period 1980 through 1988, the World 
Bank concluded an average of 10 operations per year in which privatization featured 
prominently. (World Bank:  1992, 33)  Slightly more than half of all these operations went 
to African countries.  A reasonable estimate, therefore, is that about five World Bank loans 
per year in this region explicitly called for privatization measures in the 1980s. 
 
The lessons of early privatization experience were several: 
1.  Liquidations, especially of defunct, non-functioning SOEs, proved comparatively 
easy to enact;
16 
2.  SSA governments negotiated hard to buy time before a privatization decision was 
implemented; e.g., by agreeing to studies, preparation periods, the creation and 
staffing of privatization agencies, etc., all of which, it was plausibly argued, had to 
precede privatization, and all of which took more time to execute than had been 
planned; 
3.  Management contracts and leases were easier to implement than outright sales; 
4.  Joint ventures and sales of minority stakes were more readily accepted and could 
be put in place faster than transfers of a majority of equity;  
5.  Sales to non-nationals, or even to citizens of non-African ethnicity,  consistently 
raised difficulties and moved slowly, if at all; and 
                                                           
15 “Privatization” here refers to a range of actions involving the private sector in the management, financing 
and ownership of a SOE, from management contracts, through leases and concessions, to the transfer of a 
majority equity stake to a private owner. 
16 Though these could drag on interminably; e.g., in Kenya the Uplands Bacon SOE was in receivership for at 
least 14 years.   18
6.  In this period, the problems of infrastructure SOEs were addressed through 
reform, not privatization. 
 
Once again, the Senegalese case is instructive.
17 In its first and second structural 
adjustment programs (1980 and 1984), conditionality on privatization dealt with studies of 
what should and could be sold, the optimal sales methods to be applied, and the creation 
of a body, the Special Commission on State Disengagement, to guide the process.  Only in 
SAL III (1987) did more demanding conditionality call for divestiture action.  In response, 
in 1987 the Commission published a list of 10 SOEs in which the share of state ownership 
was to be reduced by the sale of stock.  In only two of the ten would a majority stake be 
transferred; in the other eight it was a matter of further reducing what was already a 
minority government share.  In 1988, the Commission published a second list of 10 
additional firms to be divested.  However, the government at once removed the two 
largest firms from this second list, claiming that they required restructuring prior to sale.  
By the end of 1989 no buyers had come forward for any SOE on either list, or at least no 
buyers acceptable to the Commission.  Regarding privatization, it was clear, or should 
have been, that Senegal (and a number of other African countries where events moved in 
a similar manner) was not committed to the reform, and was doing the minimum 
necessary to placate the IFIs and maintain the dialogue—and the resource flow. 
 
To sum up:   By1990, following a decade of donor-supported SOE reform programs, the 
aggregate performance of the SOE sector in most African countries was not much better, 
and in some countries worse, than it had been in 1980.   Financial burdens, direct or 
indirect, remained large and damaging.  Efficiency levels remained low. Data collection 
and monitoring efforts too often ended with the departure of the technical assistance 
personnel that had helped put them in place; they were rarely sustained. Particularly with 
regard to infrastructure SOEs, one saw in the 1980s persistent repetition in a sequence of 
both adjustment and investment loans of the same set of policy and structural conditions, 
indicating that the changes had not been enacted the first, or even the second or the third 
time called for.  The percentage of GDP accounted for by SOEs in SSA did fall somewhat 
over the decade, due to the declines in subsidies and SOE numbers; but, again, the decrease 
was less than anticipated.   
 
The donors and IFIs concluded from the experience of the 1980s that the problems of 
African SOEs were numerous, serious and resistant to change by the means and methods so 
far applied.  Something new was needed. Despite the difficulties encountered in 
implementing the seemingly less contentious and demanding commercialization approach 
to SOE reform, and regardless of the widespread reluctance of African governments to 
accept the rather modest amount of privatization that had been pushed by the IFIs in the 
1980s, private sector involvement became the central thrust of overall enterprise reform in 
the 1990s.   
 
                                                           
17 Senegal is chosen not because it was a particularly poor performer on SOE reform; on the contrary, the 
Government of Senegal did more than most SSA regimes to attack the SOE problem.  It is simply that there is 
a comparative wealth of information available on what they tried, and the results.     19
10.  The 1990s:  Paradigm Shift to Privatization/PPI 
                                                                                   
Part of a general trend 
Recognition of the poor record of African SOE reform coincided with a major shift in 
economic thinking that took place in the last quarter of the 20
th century (for a global 
analysis of the shift, see Yergin and Stanislaw: 1998):  Away from the Keynesian                                     
presumption that the public interest was best served by activist government intervention, 
and towards (or returning to) the Hayekian notion that “government failure” was a larger 
problem than “market failure.”  The electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan; the collapse of  the USSR and the revolutions in its satellite states; strong and 
sustained growth in OECD countries and, in consequence, an exponential increase in 
private capital available for investment in “emerging markets;” technological innovations 
in infrastructure production and distribution, especially in telecommunications; an 
extensive reworking of economic conventional wisdom on the topics of natural 
monopolies, contestable markets, and  the nature and functions of contracts——the 
emergence and commingling of these trends spread the conviction in the early 1990s that 
the optimal economic course of action, around the globe, was restraining governments and 
unleashing markets.  
 
While widespread, the conviction was not universal:  Africa remained a taker rather than a 
maker of policies.  Unlike many decision-makers in the ex-communist states and Latin 
America, most African leaders were not persuaded that the emphasis on private initiative 
was applicable and appropriate in their settings.  But the dire financial circumstances in 
which they found themselves had increased their reliance on donors in general and the IFIs 
in particular.  African governments felt they had little choice but to go along with policies 
requested and required by their financiers.  They could marginally amend the content and 
scale and slow the pace of the implementation of the policies, and they could employ 
passive non-compliance to dilute and delay their impact——but only in the rarest of cases  
could they and did they explicitly reject them.  Thus, as divestiture and PPI emerged as the 
central thrusts of IFI-supported SOE reform and conditionality, most if not all borrowing 
African governments unenthusiastically acquiesced.   
 
The experience of the 1980s had led IFI policy analysts to recognize that a country’s 
privatization prospects varied according to income level and institutional capacity.  “In 
low-income settings…privatization is more difficult to launch, and the chances of a 
negative outcome are greater.” (World Bank: 1992, 29)  The same report noted the special 
difficulties of privatizing infrastructure firms.  In these it called for the construction, prior 
to ownership change, of “a regulatory framework that separates out potentially competitive 
activities, sets out the tariff regime, establishes universal service goals, develops cost-
minimization targets, and creates a regulatory agency to supervise the established 
procedures.” (Ibid: 43)  The policy prescription was, the poorer the country and the more 
the SOE in question is a utility operating in a non-competitive environment, the more 
cautious one should be in moving to privatization. 
 
Despite the caution of theoreticians in the Bank itself, in the period 1989-92, the average 
annual number of World Bank privatization operations (worldwide) rose rapidly.  Note that   20
prior to 1992-4, and the coming on line of the numerous and large privatization programs 
in the ex-communist countries, about half of all World Bank-supported  privatization 
operations were conducted in Africa; roughly 15 African privatization operations were 
launched each year in this period.  Most of these dealt with commercial-manufacturing 
SOEs, but efforts increased to bring private partners in as managers, and more, in 
infrastructure firms.  
 
For example, in 1990, the World Bank assisted the Government of Guinea to select a 
private firm to operate and maintain existing urban water facilities, and bill and collect 
payments from customers. The project combined a management contract with performance 
incentives and a long-term lease. Government retained ownership of the assets, 
responsibility for setting policy and tariffs, and marshalling investment finance and 
expanding the network. World Bank financing assisted the firm while it tried to raise tariffs 
to cost-covering levels and improve collections, and provided government with some 
investment capital to expand the network. This type of partnership operation became a 
model for infrastructure SOE reform efforts.   
 
So:  In the 1980s, privatization had been proposed sparingly by the IFIs, as a last resort for 
commercial-manufacturing SOEs beyond reasonable hope of rehabilitation.  In a short 
space of time the prescription altered.   In the 1990s, donors came to view rehabilitation as  
legitimate only to the extent that it was a step on the road to liquidation, divestiture or PPI. 
Previously, four-fifths or more of World Bank SOE reform conditions had focused on 
restructuring, with one-fifth or less on privatization.  These percentages were now 
substantially reversed.
18   The notion was discredited that there were some industrial firms 
of a “strategic” nature in which public ownership and operation was justified.  In 
consequence, all SOEs producing tradable goods became fair game for privatization, the 
sooner the better.  The same clarity and speed could not be applied in the more complex 
infrastructure cases.
19  Here, the prescription was to search for a degree of private sector 
involvement, along the lines of the Guinea water case noted above.  By the mid-1990s, the 
idea of making SOEs function efficiently and effectively under government management 
was largely abandoned by the IFIs.  Privatization and PPI became the order of the day. 
 
Since our main interest is in infrastructure, we concentrate henceforth on PPI.   The process 
started slowly:  From 1984-89, 26 developing countries (only one or two in Africa) 
awarded 72 PPI contracts having a value of $19 billion US.  From 1990 through 2003, PPI 
exploded:  Some 140 different low- and middle-income countries, including almost every 
African state, awarded  2,731  PPI contracts, attracting an astonishing investment 
commitments of more than $800 billion. (Source of this and other numbers, below:  World 
Bank PPI database)  About half of these activities involved ownership or management by 
                                                           
18 Documents and summaries allow one to quantify the aims of World Bank-led SOE reforms in the 1980s.  
Detailed data on what took place in the 1990s must exist in World Bank project and African country records; 
but no summations, similar to those cited for the earlier period, are readily available.  The effort required to 
assemble and analyze these data would be considerable and is  beyond the scope of the present work.   
Something of this sort is presently being carried out within the Bank. 
19 Though some tried.  This author recalls being asked by an IMF official, in the early 1990s, if it was 
reasonable to insist that the Government of Kenya turn over its unreformed electricity system to full private 
ownership within 90 days.     21
private actors: divestitures, leases, concessions and management contracts.  The other half 
were “greenfield” (i.e., new private) investments to add capacity, for example in electricity 
generating plants, road, bridge or port building, cellular phone systems, etc.   
 
The sums of private capital invested in infrastructure in emerging markets in this period 
were in every year at least double, and in some years six, seven or ten times greater than the 
capital being transferred by “official” sources; i.e., the IFIs and bi-lateral donors. This was 
very heady stuff.  As markets surged, total private flows to PPI in emerging markets-
developing countries rose from about $5 billion at the end of the 1980s, to close to $30 
billion in 1992, to a peak of about $120 billion in 1997.  At that moment, it seemed as if a 
revolution had broken out and quickly been won by the private sector rebels.   
 
Countries in Latin America and the East Asia/Pacific were the leading recipients in this 
process, with countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia not far behind.  
 
PPI in Africa 
 
As of 2005, in half of African countries, the water, fixed-line telephone, railways, airlines 
and petroleum products distribution sectors are still state-owned and operated companies; 
the percentage rises to two-thirds for electricity generation, transmission and distribution. 
(World Bank: 2005, 13)  PPI started much more slowly in Sub-Saharan Africa;  only 25 
such operations came on line (were “financially closed”) from 1991 through 1993.   
However, the number jumped to 70 in the period 1994-97.  After 1997,  capital flows and 
PPI projects declined in most parts of the world,  but infrastructure investors sustained their 
interest in Africa for some time——closing an additional 140 contracts from 1998-2003.   
(More recently, African PPI appears to be trailing off; only 16 projects closed in SSA in 
2003, the last year for which data are available.)  The point is that the timing of PPI in 
Africa differed from other parts of the world. 
 
Nonetheless, of the  2,731 PPI  contracts concluded in 1990-2003, only 224 were in SSA, 
scattered over 47 different countries.  Investments in these  African PPI operations totaled 
an impressive $33.4 billion US.  PPI in SSA in these years accounted for about 40 percent 
of all infrastructure investment, with government-generated and official investment 
splitting the remainder.  Still, while important in absolute terms, investment in Africa 
represented only about four percent of the worldwide PPI total——and the most revealing 
fact is that almost half of all investment in Africa went to South Africa alone.  The forty-six 
other participating SSA countries have so far garnered  a very modest 2 percent of the PPI 
investment bonanza. 
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TABLE 1 
PPI PROJECTS BY REGION & INVESTMENT AMOUNTS, 1990-2003 
 
 
REGION COUNTRIES PROJECTS INVESTMENTS $ 
(in  US billions)
E. Asia/Pacific             18        701       187.7  
Europe/Cent. Asia              26        524        118.6 
Lat. America/Carib.              28      1008       378.8 
Mid. East/No. Africa            14          76         38.3 
South Asia              6                  198         45.0 
Africa 
  ( South Africa alone) 
          47  
           
      224 
      (25) 
       
       33.4 
      (16.0) 
Totals           139      2,731       801.0 





  PPI in S-S AFRICA, 1990-2003, by SECTOR  & INVESTMENT AMOUNT (US $ billions) 
  
SECTOR AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
Energy     7,375              22.1 
Telecommunications   21,724              65.0 
Transport     4,081              12.2 
Water & Sewerage        230                0.7  
        TOTAL   33,410            100.0 




PPI in S-S AFRICA  1990-2003, by SECTOR & TYPE of PPI OPERATION
SECTOR GREENFIELD DIVESTITURE CONCESSION MC/LC* TOTALS
Energy  22 ops,   44.9 %  5 ops,    10.2 %  12 ops,   24.5 %  10 ops, 20.4 %     49, 100 % 
Telecomm  95 ops,   84.8 %  15 ops,  13.4 %    0 ops,      0 %    2 ops,  1.8 %    112, 100 % 
Transport  13 ops,   26.5 %    3 ops,    6.1 %   22 ops,  44.9 %  11 ops, 22.4 %    49,  100 % 
Water & 
Sewerage 
  2 ops,  14.3 %     0 ops,     0  %     2 ops,  14.3 %   10 ops, 71.4 %     14,  100 % 
Total # PPI 
by type 
    132,  58.9 %       23,  10.3 %      36,  16.1 %     33,  14.7 %    224 
Source:  Calculated from World Bank PPI Database.  (* MC/LC = managements contracts and/or lease 
contracts.) 
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TABLE 4: 
TOP FIVE RECEIVERS OF PPI INVESTMENT IN S-S AFRICA, 1990-2003 
COUNTRY PPI INVESTMENT,   $ BNs % TOTAL PPI 
INVESTMENT IN SSA
South Africa              16.0  47.9 
Nigeria                3.1  9.3 
Mozambique                2.5  7.5 
Cote d’Ivoire                 1.4       4.2 
Tanzania                0.9                                  2.8 
Total                23.9                           71.7 
Source:  Calculated from World Bank PPI Database. 
 
 
Telecommunications accounts for half of all PPI operations and almost 2/3 of PPI 
investment in SSA (more than half of it going to South Africa alone).  Energy is a distant 
second, transport farther back, and PPI in African water and sewerage is  comparatively 
miniscule, both in project number and investment amount.  Greenfield investments have 
been by far the most frequent form of African PPI, followed by concessions and 
management or lease contracts.  More than half of all investment generated has been in 
greenfield operations (which assist in reform of a sector, but are only indirectly SOE 
reform measures).   Divestiture operations rank second.  
 
The type of PPI favored varies by sector. Greenfield investments are the dominant method 
in telecommunications, and to a lesser extent, in energy; management- and lease-contracts  
in water and sewerage, and concessions in African transport.
20  Divestiture—the turning 
over of a major equity stake to a private operator—has rarely been applied in African 
infrastructure,  except in telecommunications.   
 
The upshot of all these data is as follows:  SSA participated in the PPI boom of the past 15 
years, but at a slower pace and to a lesser extent than other parts of the world.  The bulk of 
regional PPI investment that has occurred has gone to South Africa; the next most 
attractive African countries lag far behind. (see Table 4)   There are very many SSA 
countries that have concluded  but one or two PPI projects, raising a few million dollars.  
Nonetheless,  SSA did a bit better than other regions in sustaining investor interest 
following the post-Asian crisis declines in investment.  Relative to the size of African 
economies, and the total amount of investment raised from all sources, PPI is of great 
importance—especially in light of the existing and likely future magnitudes of official 
flows.   
 
Most of this PPI activity has been actively sponsored or endorsed by the IFIs.  Some 
investors have entered on their own, and some African governments have sought PPI 
without IFI stimulation or assistance, especially in the increasingly competitive, lower risk, 
telecommunications sector.  What is known concerning the results of this altered reform 
strategy?  
 
                                                           
20 For a discussion of the methods applied in each sector, see Gökgür, 2004.   24
Results in general 
 
Starting at the end of the 1980s and gathering strength through the 1990s, many studies 
looked at the results of privatization, attempting to measure the financial, economic, 
distributive and social welfare effects.  A number of these, particularly those looking at 
infrastructure privatization, devised new methods to assess privatization’s impact on the 
range of stakeholders affected by the transaction—government, the new private owners, 
workers, consumers, and even competitors.  The most sophisticated of these analyses strove 
to determine the extent to which the transaction added to or subtracted from the country’s 
general economic welfare, and how the gains or losses were distributed among the relevant 
actors.  To do this required the establishment of a “counterfactual;” that is, as precise as 
possible an estimate of what would have happened had the firm remained under state 
control.
21  The findings of most of the empirical studies, including the welfare studies, were 
generally—though not entirely, and, as we shall see, not decisively—encouraging to 
supporters of privatization and PPI. 
 
First, the positive aspects:  Post-sale, in the main and on average, firms tend to improve 
their profitability, efficiency (as measured by labor productivity) and returns to 
shareholders.  Many infrastructure firms submitted to PPI show improved finances, a much 
better quality and a larger quantity of service.  Many show network expansion at a rate 
much higher than that achieved while the firm was under public management. The number 
of employees tends to decline (which largely explains the increases in productivity).  But in 
most countries, and except in railroads, the overall number of infrastructure workers 
dismissed due to privatization is relatively small, and not a major contributor to general 
unemployment levels.  Post-sale, prices tend to decline for telephone services.  The price 
record is mixed in energy, and shows general (not universal) increases in transport and 
water and sewerage.  Government finances tend to improve as subsidies decline.  The 
relatively few studies estimating changes in welfare mainly record positive results, with 
surprisingly few instances of increases in inequity due to the reform.  In sum, 
technical/economic assessments of privatization broadly conclude that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. 
 
Now the not-so-good news:  The number of rigorous studies remains low; we do not 
possess sufficient information to reach a definitive conclusion regarding PPI’s effects.
22  
Moreover, the general superiority of privatization/PPI to state control is not conclusively 
proved by showing that the number of cases with positive outcomes is larger than the 
number of negative instances.  Most of the positive studies do reveal some sub-optimal 
outcomes, for at least some set of stakeholders at some point in time.   Several case studies 
do reveal poor and unanticipated general outcomes, and a few describe investor 
withdrawal, project cancellation, and public protest, in some cases violent.  These are the 
cases seized upon by the public and by opponents of the process. It might be that the total 
                                                           
21 See, for a sample of the best and most rigorous assessments, Galal, et al., 1994; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; 
Chisari et al., 1999; and Mackenzie and Mookherjee, 2003. 
22 On the other hand, the superior performance of privatized as opposed to state-owned firms in 
manufacturing, commercial and industrial—that is, non-infrastructure— sectors seems very well established.   25
costs of the negative cases are greater than the total benefits of the positive ones. In the 
absence of an aggregated study of the counterfactual, we do not know. 
 
A second concern is that the highly positive PPI results come mainly from cases in high or 
middle income countries.  For example, the bulk of studies showing combined technical, 
financial and welfare improvements from PPI come from Latin America.  African policy-
makers and observers are not convinced that the same results could be obtained in their 
poorer, institutionally weaker countries—and if they were tempted to follow the Latin 
American model, recent PPI reversals and ensuing, related political turmoil in some 
countries in that region (e.g., Bolivia) may have dissuaded them. 
 
  PPI results in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Until recently, there have been fewer assessments of privatization/PPI in SSA, and those 
undertaken were, due to data problems, forced to use less sophisticated methodologies
23 
than those applied in Latin America.  In her recent review of the results of PPI in SSA, 
Gökgür found positive economic, financial, quality, quantity and distributive outcomes 
from PPI in telecommunications in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda—but noted 
that the greater the degree of competition enhancement simultaneous with the PPI event, 
the better the overall results.  (Gökgür:  1994, 20-22)
24    Gökgür also called attention to  
the absence of similar rigorous cross country assessments in the other three infrastructure 
sectors.   
 
There has been some careful work carried out on PPI in the water sector in a few SSA 
countries (Ménard and Clarke: 2002).  The conclusions are that performance improved 
under PPI, compared to what reasonably could have been expected to happen under 
continued public management.  However, the gains were less than expected by all the 
parties (government, the investor, the supporting World Bank), and they came at a much 
slower than anticipated pace.  The problem of non- or slow and partial payment of water 
bills by government consumers was not solved under the PPI arrangements, neither in 
Guinea, nor  Cote d’Ivoire nor Senegal.   
 
Wallsten (1999) examined econometrically the effects of privatization, competition 
enhancement and regulation in telecommunications reform in 30 countries, half of them in 
Africa, the rest in Latin America. Enhanced competition produces the clearest, most 
positive effects.  Ownership change by itself “does not appear to generate many benefits,” 
but does so when combined with separate and independent regulation.  These are summary 
conclusions, not disaggregated by region.  Wallsten notes that “….the finding that 
privatization is negatively correlated with the number of main lines….could arise because 
                                                           
23 In their book on African privatization, Campbell-White and Bhatia (1998: 125) noted that “Monitoring and 
evaluation have largely been ignored; hence the paucity of data on—and the difficulty of judging—the 
progress and impact of privatization to date.”  
24 Indeed, analysts of privatization have long had trouble distinguishing between the post-sale effects of 
ownership change and the effects of concurrent policy change and competition enhancement.  Many 
economists see competition as a more important determinant of outcomes than ownership per se.  This has led 
critics to argue that privatization is secondary or even unnecessary; “all” that is needed is increased 
competition.   26
countries are more likely to privatize their incumbent telecom provider when service is 
poor….” (14)  Thus, it may not be that privatization caused performance to weaken, as 
suggested by the regression, but rather that the weakest telecommunication firms were the 
ones to be privatized. 
 
Regarding energy, Gökgür’s survey concludes that “Cote d’Ivoire is the only country 
where efficiency gains after private participation in electricity were measured and 
reported.”  (Gökgür:  2004, 18)  There are, however, at least two other (not formally 
published) assessments of PPI in electricity, in Gabon and Namibia (PPIAF: 2002a and 
2002b).  The Gabon report is highly positive; it notes consistent improvement in electricity 
service quality over the life of the concession contract.  Despite a reduction in tariffs, the 
energy provider self-financed all contractually required repair and expansion investments, 
and met or exceeded all targets of network extension to small towns and rural areas.   
Following a confrontation in 1999, government agreed to timely payments of all arrears 
and current utility obligations, and has lived up to the bargain.  This is seen as a major 
factor in this operation’s success.  (WorldBank/PPIAF: 2002a)    
 
The Namibian case is quite revealing, both for it’s recounting of similarly impressive 
technical and financial gains, and for its depiction of the intrusion and importance of socio-
political factors in the ultimate fate of the operation.  Under a 5 year management contract 
to provide service to a rural, previously underserved region, the private operator doubled 
the number of customers, held employment steady, reduced tariffs for the smallest and 
presumably poorest consumers, reduced system losses from 45 to 7 percent, and effected 
numerous and substantial quality improvements. (World Bank/PPIAF:  2002b)  Its reward:  
The contract was not renewed and the national SOE energy provider, that had not shown 
interest in bidding for the contract the first time around, lobbied hard to discredit the private 
provider and obtain the assignment—which it did.  The explanation is complex, having to 
do with the failure of the original contract to deal with the concerns of the local government 
authorities in the region being served, who then opposed renewal of the contract; along 
with the perception of the national energy SOE that it was being shown up by the private 
provider.  The case writers’ conclusions were that stakeholders valued the improved service 
but thought it was “just management;” i.e., that anyone could emulate the private provider’s 
success.  They also reasoned that “private sector participation is not just about 
infrastructure investment,” and that somehow the PPI provider must “avoid politics but pay 
attention to politics.”  (Ibid.: 35-36)   
 
An early draft of a review of  seven African PPI cases
25 states that none of the contracts 
examined have produced levels of service comparable to industrialized country settings, 
and all have encountered significant problems, either financial or political or, frequently, 
both.  Nonetheless, as with most technical examinations, this study concludes that the 
results are  “better compared to what the outcomes would have been without private sector 
contracts.”  (Castalia Strategic Advisors:  2005, 1)  The authors argue that excessively high 
expectations and inappropriate measurement criteria have been applied to African PPI 
                                                           
25 Concessions, lease and management contracts in Cote d’Ivoire (water), Guinea (water), Gabon (electricity 
and water), Malawi (electricity), Mozambique (water), Senegal (water) and Tanzania (electricity).   27
efforts, by both donors and governments.  The use of more reasonable, less ambitious 
evaluation criteria shows more positive results. 
 
However, if a fair number of  arguable positive case studies of PPI do not add up to a solid 
conclusion in the rest of the world, a much smaller number of case studies is even less 
convincing in Africa.  An additional way to measure the impact of PPI in Africa is by 
looking at the number and size of contracts that have been cancelled or classed as 
“distressed;” i.e., “projects where the government or the operator has either requested 
contract termination or are in international arbitration.”  (PPI Database, Glossary)  Table 5 




Cancelled and Distressed PPI Projects, 1990-2003 
By Region and Sector 
 
Region Energy  Telecomm  Transport  Water  & 
Sewerage 
Totals* 












0 2  1  0  3 
 2%; 2% 
South Asia  3  1  1  0  5 
  3%; 2%
Africa 3  5  3  1  12 
5%; 
0.6% 
Totals 60  21  46  15  142 
Source:  World Bank PPI Database.  * Percentages below “Totals” in the last column refer to percent of 
projects cancelled or distressed and percent of total investment in the region involved in such operations. 
 
By this reckoning, Africa is one percentage point above the mean in terms of proportion of 
PPI projects in difficulty.  The difference is small, and the troubled African operations are 
quite modest in size, affecting only a tiny amount of total investment.     
 
However, there is reason to believe that these numbers underestimate the problems that PPI 
is currently facing in SSA.  First, the table does not show lease-, management-contracts and 
concessions that were not cancelled, nor officially called into question, but were not 
renewed after their initial period expired—as in the Namibian example given above and the 
non-renewal (after a one-year extension) of the water lease in Guinea. The least that one 
can say in such cases is that sustainability was not attained,
26 unless it can be shown that 
                                                           
26 Though this may be a matter of differing expectations on the part of governments, that  are said to see 
management contracts as a means of improving public sector performance, and donors—who regard such   28
the management contractors left behind a set of trained and competent local replacements.  
Second, a fair amount of PPI activity in Africa was initiated after 2000.  Normally, 
problems serious enough to warrant the distressed label take time to arise.  Perhaps the rate 
of problems accelerated in 2004, a period not yet recorded in the PPI database?  And 
indeed,  a number of World Bank infrastructure personnel working on Africa report a 
recent increase in troubled PPI projects. Third, the definition of “distress” does not cover 
projects where one party or the other is seeking a renegotiation of the contract, but has not 
yet escalated the conflict to the level of cancellation or a request for international 
arbitration.  Again, World Bank infrastructure personnel note an increase in such cases.  A 
snapshot of PPI in African energy (Benoit: 2005) notes that a number of operations 
originally contracted as concessions—giving a large amount of control and associated risk 
to the private provider—are presently unsatisfying to one or both of the contracting parties.  
A number are likely to be renegotiated into lower risk, and lower control, management 
contracts; in some there is a risk of total termination.   
 
Similar concerns are expressed in the water sector.  There has recently been a non-renewal 
of a management contract, private provider withdrawal and a cancellation of a lease in 
Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania respectively. The most recent and dramatic instance 
was in Tanzania where, in late May 2005, the Government cancelled the water sector lease, 
called the performance bond, and summarily deported three expatriate managers—whose 
firm is now considering legal action.  The least that one can say is that all is not well with 





We have reviewed a few of the few assessments of African PPI initiatives.   The good news 
is that many more are presently underway and a larger body of findings should soon be 
available.
27  The existing case studies tend to look at technical successes; few detailed 
assessments have been made of failures, such as electricity PPI in Senegal, or the water 
cases in Mozambique and Tanzania.   These are, to repeat, presently under review; the 
recent spate of problem cases is being tabulated and assessed in detail.  
 
One must also account for the hostility towards PPI initiatives, successful or not, on the 
part of many—but by no means all—African leaders, intellectuals, journalists, and the local 
and international NGOs that observe and comment on economic programs.  We have 
already noted the results of the survey showing the low level of privatization’s popularity in 
many African states.  A newspaper editorial from Zambia gives the flavor of the 
dissatisfaction:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contracts as the first step on the route to greater private sector participation and control.  Thus, governments 
may be less upset by non-renewal than donors.  This view is presented in Castalia, op. cit. 
27 A preliminary draft of the first of  a set of studies in process (Gökgür and Jones:  2005), reviewing the 
experience with water PPI in Mozambique, again concludes that technical performance greatly improved 
under the contract—but that many consumers nonetheless feel they are paying more for largely unimproved 
service.   29
……..despite having liberalized its markets, as dictated by the IMF and the World 
Bank, Zambia has still not started benefiting from it......Why should we privatize 
Zambia National Commercial Bank, Zesco Limited (electricity) and Zamtel 
(telecommunications) simply because the IMF and the World Bank want us to do 
so even when the great majority of Zambians are opposed to it because they believe 
it is not in their best interest? (Editorial in the Lusaka Post: 11.28.02) 
 
Less stridently and more recently, a similar view is expressed in an editorial from 
Tanzania: 
 
TTCL (telecom) is beset with staff-management wrangling, Tanesco’s (electricity)  
performance has not improved considerably, and City Water—the termination of 
whose contract has triggered a crisis—didn’t meet the expectations of water 
consumers. 
It is apparent that there are weaknesses in the way privatization and joint venture 
schemes are handled, which ought to be addressed.  For we surely must have learnt 
that foreigners are not miracle workers and that our country has a crop of managers 
and technical cadre that can do wonders, if availed a sufficiently conducive 
environment.  (Editorial in the Dar es Salaam Sunday Observer, May 22, 2005) 
 
Clearly, infrastructure and financial sector privatizations have been the prime targets for 
popular and official criticism.  The larger amount of privatization carried out in African 
commercial and manufacturing sectors has not come in for nearly as much censure. One 
problem in infrastructure is the perceived loss of sovereignty; i.e., the turning-over of what 
are seen as vital and valuable national assets to multinational firms (or worse, to firms 
based in neighboring countries; e.g., the sale of Zambian firms to South Africans).  A 
second part of the problem is a widespread, though questionable, belief that privatization 
inevitably results in steep increases in utility prices post-sale—leading to the claim that the 
poor cannot or can no longer afford essential services.
28  Third, there is suspicion that many 
PPI privatization and concession transactions have been tainted by fraud and corruption, or 
just excessive aggressiveness on the part of the private provider.  That is, that the private 
bidders have colluded to reduce the price paid for a firm or concession; that they manage to 
get their foot in the door by contracting to provide a service at price x, but once in office 
claim that undisclosed vital information forces them to renegotiate the agreement;
29 that 
politicians have taken bribes to favor one particular bidder or to rig the contractual or 
regulatory rules in favor of a private firm or owner; or more broadly, that many 
                                                           
28 The argument is dubious:  Recall that the African poor rarely have access to formal electricity or water 
networks, and they tend to pay much higher unit prices for these services, or substitutes for these services 
(e.g., kerosene or batteries), than those connected.  Price increases in the formal systems normally affect the 
relatively affluent. On the other hand, as networks expand and offer access to previously unserved clients, 
connection fees can be very large; one can make a good argument that subsidization of these fees is justified 
on poverty reduction grounds.  (see Estache, Foster and Wodon:  2002) 
29 This is a two-way street:  No doubt, some private providers have employed such tactics.  On the other hand, 
some governments have refused , for purely political reasons, to honor the commitments they agreed to in 
contracts.  A major hindrance to the construction of credible PPI contracts is the paucity and poor quality of 
historical technical and financial data on the firms in question.  The absence of benchmarks allows private 
contractors to claim that wrong or missing information justifies renegotiation, and governments to claim that 
the private provider is not living up to expectations.   30
governments in Africa lack the skills and resources to negotiate well with multinational or 
even domestic private firms in such a way as to protect the public interest during the sale, 
or to create and sustain competent, independent regulatory institutions post-sale.   
 
In Africa, as elsewhere, the basic political conundrum of privatization (not just in 
infrastructure) is as follows:  PPI’s benefits for consumers at large tend to be dispersed 
among amorphous, unorganized segments of the public.  The benefits are small for each 
affected consumer.  They occur in the medium term, or at least they accrue to a significant 
size in the medium term.  A sustained decline by 5—10 % in average electricity tariffs, for 
example, is in aggregate a substantial and worthwhile gain for any economy.  And 
increased disposable income by a few currency units a billing period is no doubt welcome 
to the great mass of consumers.  But gains of this nature do not move masses of consumers 
to mobilize politically in favor of the policy, much less the reforming regime. In any case, 
some consumers, particularly poor ones, probably do not associate any gains from reduced 
tariffs (to the extent they even perceive them
30) as having anything to do with privatization 
of the service.  Modest average real price declines thrill economists, but not voters. 
 
The costs of privatization, in contrast, are concentrated among a visible, vocal and 
urbanized few—dismissed workers, represented by powerful public sector unions; 
bureaucrats in supervisory ministries that lose their authority, perks and perhaps even 
raison d’etre; managers and board members of SOEs removed pre- or post-sale, upper-
income consumers about to lose a service long-furnished at a subsidized price.  Though the 
sum of their welfare losses are, presumably, much less than the aggregate gain, these actors 
possess “voice” and access to power; they can and do make their needs and views known.   
They are motivated to do so because the losses for each affected individual are 
comparatively large, and they occur in the very short term, indeed, in the case of affected 
workers, often before the completion of the transaction.  Losses of comparatively large 
magnitude, among stakeholders of this nature, typically result in protest, direct political 
action, or equally (if not more) effective bureaucratic delay and misdirection.  The reality is 
that it is easier to mobilize protest against losses than to engender gratitude for gains; and 
the gratitude created by the awarding of any gain is far less politically potent than the 
protest generated by the imposition of an equivalent loss.   
 
One can argue that much anti-privatization sentiment in Africa stems from a lack of 
understanding or appreciation of what PPI has accomplished,  combined with a pronounced 
tendency to forget both the poor past performance of state-owned infrastructure firms, and 
the very poor track record of performance improvement attempts that did not involve the 
private sector.  While technically accurate, such an argument is politically ineffective. 
 
All this leaves African policy makers, and those that wish to assist them, facing an acute 
problem:  Both the quantity and quality of African infrastructure services are sub-optimal, 
and have been for some time.  Past reform tactics based on an evolutionary approach did 
not produce the needed and anticipated results.  Revised tactics based on privatization and 
PPI have not been as widely adopted as anticipated, nor have they generated the massive 
                                                           
30 If, as sometimes happens, the rate of inflation spikes in the post-contract period, the average consumer pays 
more in current terms, and the gain could only be perceived  when a constant currency value is used.   31
resources and changes hoped for, nor have they been widely accepted as beneficial by 
many in the African public (though it must be noted that public perceptions of PPI are 
positive in a number of specific cases where service improvements quickly occurred; e.g., 
water in Senegal and electricity in Gabon.).   
 
So:  the need to repair, modernize and expand  African infrastructure networks remains 
very great.  The financial resources required for this task must come from governments, 
official sources, and, increasingly, from private capital markets.  The two approaches on 
which reform hopes have been based have both proven deficient, though in different ways.  
The revised tactics require further revision.  The search for mechanisms that combine 
private capital and expertise with socially acceptable management and delivery must be 
renewed.    
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to state  in detail what the next phase of reform could 
and should look like.  Nonetheless, one can offer some guidance on what it should not be.  
In light of the difficulties of making PPI work effectively in Africa, one might make a case 
for a return to the SOE model.  That idea is that the experience of the last three decades has 
taught both African governments and assisting donors to be wary and vigilant, and that they 
now possess improved management and financial techniques for monitoring firm 
performance and enforcing financial discipline and quality standards. 
 
However, the experience of the 1970s and 80s, recounted in this paper, leads one to be very 
wary of any simple return to the commercialization of state owned and operated entities.  
Why? 
•  Returning to government ownership and operation means returning to a heavy 
reliance on government and official financing.  In Africa, these sources have not 
provided, and even if drastically expanded, will not provide the capital sums 
needed for network rehabilitation and expansion.   
•  Thus, if Africa infrastructure is to be renewed and enlarged to meet demand, 
private money will be required.  This will likely require passing some measure 
of control and management to the private provider.    
•  Moreover, it is not at all clear just why and how a return to the SOE approach 
would work. Where is the concrete evidence that African governments can 
resist the political pressures that in the past led them to allow politics to trump 
economics when it came to infrastructure payment and pricing issues?   Just 
how will the mistakes of the past be overcome? Unless one can provide specific 
answers to these questions there is a risk that the error of the 1990s—assuming 
that privatization had to result in better performance than state ownership and 
operation—will be repeated, this time in reverse. 
•   Finally, one must note that the World Bank (and other official lenders) has a 
strong incentive to restart and ramp up lending to infrastructure SOEs in Africa, 
over and above its recognition of the limitations of the PPI approach.  That is, as 
more middle-income countries tap private
31 capital markets for their 
                                                           
31 For example, in 9.04 Citigroup concluded the first private loan, of $300 million, to the Russia State 
Railways Corporation, an SOE,  following its successful corporatization and earning of a credit rating by an 
international rating firm.    32
infrastructure investment needs, the Bank increasingly becomes a lender to low-
income states.  In its desire and need to sustain its role as a capital-transferring 
institution, and not just an advisory agency, the Bank sees a renewed role for 
itself in infrastructure reform.  Well and good.  But in the past, the desire and 
need to lend have sometimes trumped critical acumen, and led to the approval 
or continuation of sub-optimal operations.  How will this be guarded against?  
 
In sum, the findings of recent studies in Africa suggest that PPI should not be jettisoned.  
Rather, the more productive path is to recognize the limitations of the approach, and to 
work harder at creating the conditions needed to make it function effectively.  This will 
entail, as many have recognized,  an end to the view that public and private infrastructure 
provision is a dichotomy—a case of either-or, one or the other—and a better appreciation 
of the extent to which the performance of each is dependent on the competence of the 
other.    In other words, for the private sector to perform well, public sector capacity must 
be enhanced. Moreover, proposed tactics of reform should fit more closely with the 
expectations and sentiments of the affected government and population. This broader 
approach implies a reduction in both the scope and  especially the planned speed of 
operations.  Improving infrastructure performance is a long-term matter. 
 
Adoption of this revised strategy should aid the acceptance and ease the implementation of 
infrastructure reform.  But it also has costs:  African infrastructure networks need 
expansion now, not years from now. Settling for the more cautious, politically palatable 
and socially acceptable PPI forms—for example, management contracts as opposed to 
concessions or divestitures—will not solve the capital shortage problem.  Moreover, and 
somewhat paradoxically, the more acceptable management and lease contracts place heavy 
demands on governments, in terms of designing, negotiating, evaluating and enforcing 
them.  As the Castalia study notes:  “the more limited the private sector involvement, the 
more complex is the interface with the government.”  (2005, 1)  And the creation and 
sustaining of government capacity is precisely the point where both the state-led and the 
PPI approaches have been most deficient.   
 
The bottom line is that Africa has huge infrastructure needs that, for various reasons, are 
not being addressed the only way that is financially possible:  with private money. 
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